Clicky
  • home Home
  • keyboard_arrow_right COVID-19
  • keyboard_arrow_right Posts
  • keyboard_arrow_rightSouth Africa’s military is not suited for the fight against COVID-19. Here’s why

South Africa’s military is not suited for the fight against COVID-19. Here’s why

By: Craig Bailie, Stellenbosch University

South African soldiers enforcing the COVID-19 lockdown in Mitchells Plain, Cape Town.
EPA/Nic Bothma

 

The South African National Defence Force is not suited for internal deployment, particularly where it must fight “an invisible enemy” such as the coronavirus. Its conduct while enforcing the COVID-19 lockdown has brought this reality to the fore.

The military has been trained and equipped for precisely the opposite of what President Cyril Ramaphosa has asked of it – to save lives. Its purpose is to defend the country and its people against physical, external enemies – by killing such enemies if need be.

This mismatch between defence policy and practice is fundamental to understanding the circumstances around the death of Collins Khosa, allegedly at the hands of the army and police during a COVID-19 lockdown patrol.

Military affairs expert, Professor Lindy Heinecken, captures this issue in her book, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Military:
Lost in Transition and Transformation
.

Chapter 3, on the South African military’s involvement in peace missions, is particularly relevant to understanding its lack of readiness to help contain COVID-19. She highlights the difficulties the military has in executing “secondary tasks”, when it’s “structured, trained, (and) funded” for warfare.

My argument that the South African military is not up to the task of fighting COVID-19 draws from research on its internal deployment and my own continuing research on the democratic nature of South Africa’s civil-military relations.

I have gained additional insights on the social and cultural impediments to nurturing the necessary humanitarian element in the military from focusing on civil-military relations over the past decade.

What are the reasons for the military’s unpreparedness? This question can be answered by giving attention to South Africa’s political and military leadership, the education and training offered to the military, and how it’s been financed.

Leadership

The responsibility for preparing any military to fight an unconventional security threat in a constitutional democracy ultimately rests with the country’s political and military leaders.

Over the past 26 years, these leaders have failed to prepare the military for secondary roles such peace missions, let alone to a fight a virus.

They have failed to create the kind of culture that allows for the alignment of what the military does and its strategic intent. South Africa’s political leaders have purposed the military largely for conventional roles, yet they deploy it mostly for unconventional tasks such as peacekeeping, fighting crime, and against COVID-19.

According to Heinecken this disconnect sits at

the heart of the challenges the military started to face in the post-apartheid era (p. 26).

Education and training

Education is another tool for transforming organisational culture, so that an organisation is better prepared to perform its role.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa addresses the military ahead of its COVID-19 deployment.
GCIS/Flickr

It was appropriate that the defence force launched a civic education programme in 1997. This was three years after the first democratic elections in the country.

It followed the amalgamation of the then South African Defence Force, the mainstay of apartheid rule, with the military forces of the nominally independent “homelands” and those of the liberation movements.

The purpose of the civic education programme was to establish compliance among members of the new defence force “with the new democratic vision of the government (and society)”. Then deputy minister of defence, Ronnie Kasrils, proclaimed:

Everyone in the SA National Defence Force, from troops to the top brass, will go back to school.

My own experience of civic education at the Oudtshoorn Infantry School in 2010, and reports on the conduct of South African soldiers on peace missions and at home, both prior to and during COVID-19, point to
the failure of the military’s civic education programme to adequately inculcate respect for human rights and dignity in the military.

In short, the education and training of South Africa’s soldiers over the past 26 years have not properly prepared them for secondary roles, such as peacekeeping or fighting new security threats like COVID-19.

It’s no surprise, therefore, that William Gumede, of the Democracy Works Foundation, a southern African non-profit company focused on the development of democracy, has called for the military’s training curriculum to be overhauled,
“to make it more human rights based”.

Finance

Military leaders can only execute their mandate, which includes education and training, to the extent that they have the necessary resources.

Over the years the military budget has been cut. In addition, almost 80% of the budget is spent on personnel. This has prompted criticism that the country’s military has become “a welfare and not a warfare agency”.

Conclusion

In truth, nothing could have fully prepared any of the world’s militaries for managing the COVID-19 pandemic. But, had South Africa’s political and military leaders done a better job of stewarding the country’s military resource over the past 26 years, it would be better prepared for the challenge.

Political leaders, in consultation with defence leaders and civil society, must engage in realistic discussion about what the military’s primary purpose should be. They may well decide to make secondary tasks the new “primary role”. They should then align its education and training with that role.

Whatever direction they choose will cost money. But, given the parlous state of South Africa’s economy, even prior to COVID-19, it’s unlikely the military budget will increase for a long time. This calls for the budget to be spent prudently, in line with the military’s core mandate.The Conversation

Craig Bailie, Lecturer in Political Science (Mil), Stellenbosch University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by: Natasha



UpComing Shows

DownLoad Our Mobile App

Privacy Policy

THIS PRIVACY STATEMENT FORMS PART OF KAYA 959’S TERMS OF USE POLICY. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH ANY TERM OF THIS PRIVACY STATEMENT, YOU MUST CEASE YOUR ACCESS OF THIS WEBSITE IMMEDIATELY. 

POPIA ActTo promote the protection of personal information processed by public and private bodies; to introduce certain conditions so as to establish minimum requirements for the processing of personal information; to provide for the establishment of an Information Regulator to exercise certain powers and to perform certain duties and functions in terms of this Act and the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000; to provide for the issuing of codes of conduct; to provide for the rights of persons regarding unsolicited electronic communications and automated decision making; to regulate the flow of personal information across the borders of the Republic; and to provide for matters connected therewith.

RECOGNISING THAT—

  • section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, provides that everyone has the right to privacy;
  • the right to privacy includes a right to protection against the unlawful collection, retention, dissemination and use of personal information;
  • the State must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights;

AND BEARING IN MIND THAT—

  • consonant with the constitutional values of democracy and openness, the need for economic and social progress, within the framework of the information society, requires the removal of unnecessary impediments to the free flow of information, including personal information;

AND IN ORDER TO—

  • regulate, in harmony with international standards, the processing of personal information by public and private bodies in a manner that gives effect to the right to privacy subject to justifiable limitations that are aimed at protecting other rights and important interests,
  1. Definitions and Interpretation

1.1.“Personal Information” means information relating to an identifiable, living, natural person and where it is applicable, identifiable, existing juristic person, including all information as defined in the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013. 

1.2  Parliament assented to POPIA on 19 November 2013. The commencement date of section 1Part A of Chapter 5section 112 and section 113 was 11 April 2014. The commencement date of the other sections was 1 July 2020 (with the exception of section 110 and 114(4). The President of South Africa has proclaimed the POPI commencement date to be 1 July 2020.

 
1.3. “Processing” means the creation, generation, communication, storage, destruction of personal information as more fully defined in the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013.  

1.4. “You” or the “user” means any person who accesses and browses this website for any purpose. 

1.4. “Website” means the website of the KAYA 959 at URL www.kaya959.co.za or such other URL as KAYA 959 may choose from time to time.   

  1. Status and Amendments

2.1. KAYA 959 respects your privacy. This privacy policy statement sets out KAYA 959’s information gathering and dissemination practices in respect of the Website. 

2.2. This Privacy Policy governs the processing of personal information provided to KAYA 959 through your use of the Website. 

2.3. Please note that, due to legal and other developments, KAYA 959 may amend these terms and conditions from time to time.  

  1. Processing of Personal Information

3.1. By providing your personal information to KAYA 959 you acknowledge that it has been collected directly from you and consent to its processing by KAYA 959. 

3.2. Where you submit Personal Information (such as name, address, telephone number and email address) via the website (e.g. through completing any online form) the following principles are observed in the processing of that information: 

3.2.1. KAYA 959 will only collect personal information for a purpose consistent with the purpose for which it is required. The specific purpose for which information is 
collected will be apparent from the context in which it is requested. 

3.2.2. KAYA 959 will only process personal information in a manner that is adequate, relevant and not excessive in the context of the purpose for which it is processed. 

3.2.3. Personal information will only be processed for a purpose compatible with that for which it was collected, unless you have agreed to an alternative purpose in writing or KAYA 959 is permitted in terms of national legislation of general application dealing primarily with the protection of personal information. 

3.2.4. KAYA 959 will keep records of all personal Information collected and the specific purpose for which it was collected for a period of 1 (one) year from the date on which it was last used. 

3.2.5. KAYA 959 will not disclose any personal information relating to you to any third party unless your prior written agreement is obtained or KAYA 959 is required to do so by law. 

3.2.6. If personal information is released with your consent KAYA 959 will retain a record of the information released, the third party to which it was released, the reason for the release and the date of release, for a period of 1 (one) year from the date on which it was last used. 

3.2.7. KAYA 959 will destroy or delete any personal information that is no longer needed by KAYA 959 for the purpose it was initially collected, or subsequently processed. 

3.3. Note that, as permitted by the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002, KAYA 959 may use personal information collected to compile profiles for statistical purposes. No information contained in the profiles or statistics will be able to be linked to any specific user.    

  1. Collection of anonymous data

4.1. KAYA 959 may use standard technology to collect information about the use of this website. This technology is not able to identify individual users but simply allows KAYA 959 to collect statistics. 

4.2. KAYA 959 may utilise temporary or session cookies to keep track of users’ browsing habits. A cookie is a small file that is placed on your hard drive in order to keep a record of your interaction with this website and facilitate user convenience. 

4.2.1. Cookies by themselves will not be used to identify users personally but may be used to compile identified statistics relating to use of services offered or to provide KAYA 959 with feedback on the performance of this website. 

4.2.2. The following classes of information may be collected in respect of users who have enabled cookies: 

4.2.2.1. The browser software used; 

4.2.2.2. IP address; 

4.2.2.3. Date and time of activities while visiting the website; 

4.2.2.4. URLs of internal pages visited; and 

4.2.2.5. referrers. 

4.3. If you do not wish cookies to be employed to customize your interaction with this website it is possible to alter the manner in which your browser handles cookies. Please note that, if this is done, certain services on this website may not be available. 

  1. Security

5.1. KAYA 959 takes reasonable measures to ensure the security and integrity of information submitted to or collected by this website, but cannot under any circumstances be held liable for any loss or other damage sustained by you as a result of unlawful access to or dissemination of any personal information by a third party. 

  1. Links to other websites

6.1. KAYA 959 has no control over and accepts no responsibility for the privacy practices of any third party websites to which hyperlinks may have been provided and KAYA 959 strongly recommends that you review the privacy policy of any website you visit before using it further. 

  1. Queries

7.1. If you have any queries about this privacy policy please contact us by emailing [email protected]